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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
Facing criminal charges at a preliminary hearing before a 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania district justice, John K. 
Henderson signed and filed a standard waiver of counsel 
form. He then petitioned the state court to allow him to 
proceed pro se, which was allowed without a recorded 
colloquy between Henderson and the judge regarding the 
dangers of self-representation. Henderson was not 
represented by counsel at a subsequent pretrial hearing 
where he unsuccessfully moved to suppress his confession. 
He was represented by counsel at his trial, where a jury 
found him guilty of burglary, criminal conspiracy, criminal 
attempt to commit burglary and criminal mischief. 
 
After failing to obtain relief from his conviction in the 
state court system, Henderson petitioned the district court 
for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. S 2254, alleging 
that his invalid waiver of counsel and subsequent lack of 
representation at the suppression hearing violated the Sixth 
Amendment. The district court denied relief and we granted 
a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(2). We 
must consider two separate but related issues: First, did 
signing a standard waiver of counsel form at the 
preliminary hearing and later petitioning the court for 
permission to proceed pro se, by themselves, constitute a 
knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to 
counsel at a subsequent suspension hearing? Second, if 
this did not satisfy Sixth Amendment waiver requirements 
and we grant a writ of habeas corpus, should the grant of 
the writ be conditioned on his receiving a new trial or 
merely a new suppression hearing? Before meeting these 
issues head-on, we must first decide whether his habeas 
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petition was time-barred under provisions of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and 
whether he exhausted state remedies before filing the 
Petition. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 2241(a), and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1291 and 2253(c)(1)(A). Henderson's Notice of Appeal was 
timely filed. Rule 4, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
We will reverse and remand to the district court to issue 
the writ, conditioned on the Commonwealth affording 
Henderson a new suppression hearing and a new trial. 
 
I. 
 
In April, 1992, the Waynesburg, Pennsylvania Police 
arrested Henderson for receiving stolen property in 
connection with the burglary of a clothing store. Once in 
police custody, Henderson confessed to the burglary of the 
clothing store and also to the attempted burglary of a 
hardware store a few months earlier. He was subsequently 
charged with both crimes. 
 
Prior to the preliminary hearing on July 6, 1992, 
Henderson applied for and was appointed a public 
defender. Because this particular attorney withdrew from 
the representation prior to the hearing, he was represented 
at the hearing by another public defender, Elizabeth Haque. 
At this hearing, Henderson submitted a form entitled 
"Waiver of Counsel" to the district justice. The standard 
form was filled out with Henderson's name, the charges of 
"Burglary, Criminal conspiracy, Criminal attempt, Criminal 
mischief & Criminal Conspiracy" and contains Henderson's 
signature below a series of pre-printed statements, 
including: 
 
       I,   John Henderson  , have  been informed that I 
       have the right to have a lawyer represent me, and if I 
       cannot afford one, one will be afforded to me without 
       cost. . . . 
 
       I,   John Henderson  , am a ware of the permissible 
       range of sentences and/or fines for the offenses 
       charged. . . . 
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       I knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waive these 
       rights and choose to act as my own lawyer at this 
       hearing/trial. 
 
App. at 33. The district justice signed the form under the 
statement, "I HAVE DETERMINED THAT THE DEFENDANT 
HAS MADE A KNOWING, VOLUNTARY, AND INTELLIGENT 
WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL." Id. 
 
On July 17, Henderson filed a "Petition to Proceed on 
own Behalf", which was granted by the trial court. It is 
unclear from the record whether Elizabeth Haque continued 
to serve as court-appointed stand-by counsel for Henderson 
after this point. Henderson next filed a pro se Motion to 
Suppress his confession, and after a suppression hearing 
on September 25 at which he represented himself, and at 
which Ms. Haque's presence is not apparent on the record, 
his Motion was denied. The court then appointed new 
counsel to represent Henderson at trial and the jury 
convicted Henderson on all counts. The trial court 
sentenced him to 5 to 20 years at Huntingdon State 
Correctional Institution. 
 
Henderson appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, 
alleging, inter alia, that he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel at the suppression hearing. His 
conviction was affirmed and the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania denied his Petition for Allowance of Appeal, 
which raised a violation of "the right to counsel." The Court 
of Common Pleas denied his Pennsylvania Post Conviction 
Relief Act Petition, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. SS 9541-9546, which 
also raised the deprivation of counsel issue. 
 
Henderson gave his Habeas Corpus Petition, which was 
addressed to the federal district court in Pittsburgh and 
dated April 16, 1996, to Huntingdon SCI prison officials for 
delivery. The record does not disclose the precise date that 
his Petition was handed to the prison officials. The record 
does reveal that the district court clerk filed the Petition on 
April 25, one day after the effective date of the AEDPA 
amendments to the federal habeas corpus statute. 
 
Our review of whether Henderson has exhausted his 
state remedies is plenary. See Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 
675, 678 (3d Cir. 1996). Whether the AEDPA applies to this 
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case, i.e., whether Henderson's Petition was pending on the 
AEDPA's April 24, 1996 enactment date, is a jurisdictional 
question subject to plenary review. See In re Flanagan, 999 
F.2d 753, 756 (3d Cir. 1993). If we conclude that the 
AEDPA applies to Henderson's petition, then we may 
reverse the state court's denial of his Sixth Amendment 
claim only if the decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States; or (2) . . . was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 
in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d); see Bey 
v. Morton, 124 F.3d 524, 528 (3d Cir. 1997). If the AEDPA's 
amendments to S 2254 do not apply, then we exercise 
simple plenary review. See Bey, 124 F.3d at 528. 
 
II. 
 
The Commonwealth has suggested that Henderson's 
Petition was filed after enactment of the AEDPA, which 
amended the federal habeas statute in two respects 
relevant to this case: (1) the AEDPA provides for a one-year 
period of limitations to file S 2254 petitions, running from 
"the date on which the judgment became final by the 
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 
seeking such review", S 2244(d)(1)(A), and (2) it imposes a 
new, limited standard of review which restricts federal court 
action by requiring deference to the state court's legal 
resolution of the issue petitioned, S 2254(d). 
 
For several discrete reasons, we are not impressed by the 
Commonwealth's tardy presentation of this argument which 
it neglected to present to the district court. First, we 
conclude that Henderson's Petition was timely filed prior to 
the effective date of the act, April 24, 1996, that therefore 
his Petition was pending on that date and that the AEDPA 
does not apply. See Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2063 
(1997). We reach this conclusion because we agree with 
Henderson's claim that he handed over his petition, which 
was dated April 16, 1996, to prison officials before April 24, 
1996 and therefore it was timely filed. See Houston v. Lack, 
487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 
112 (3d Cir. 1998) (the teachings of Houston--that delivery 
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of a notice of appeal by a pro se prisoner to prison officials 
is tantamount to filing with the clerk of court--apply to 
filing a S 2254 habeas petition). 
 
Putting aside that the Commonwealth failed to raise this 
issue before the district court, we are unable to accept its 
argument, somehow made with a straight face, that 
because the clerk received the transmittal from the prison 
on April 25, Henderson did not place it in the hands of the 
prison officials until the day before, to-wit April 24; that in 
a herculean burst of bureaucratic efficiency and postal 
service it was processed by the various levels of prison 
administration and delivered to the rural post office in 
Huntingdon, Pennsylvania that same day; that in lightning 
speed, the U.S. Postal Service carried it from Central 
Pennsylvania over the mountains to the Pittsburgh 
metropolitan distribution center--covering half the distance 
of the state--where, without any delay whatsoever, it was 
delivered to the district court clerk's office in Pittsburgh by 
the next morning. If the Commonwealth had introduced 
evidence to support this ambitious scenario, it might have 
received some favorable reception here. But no such 
evidence was submitted. And what we know as men and 
women about prison administrative procedures and the 
pace of U.S. Mail delivery, now described as "snail mail" by 
e-mail aficionados, we must not forget as judges. We will 
not accept the Commonwealth's theory that we should 
employ a kind of judicial notice to accept its theory. 
 
We recognize that "prison authorities are in a position to 
easily show when a document was received or mailed under 
established prison procedures for recording the date and 
time at which papers are received by prison officials in the 
prison's mail room." Flanagan, 999 F.3d at 757 (citing 
Houston, 108 S. Ct. at 2384). Thus, the Commonwealth 
should have been expected to support its untimeliness 
argument with prison logs documenting that Henderson 
deposited his Petition with prison authorities on April 24 or 
April 25, 1996. Absent such proof to the contrary, we 
conclude that Henderson's Petition, having arrived in 
Pittsburgh on April 25, must have been first delivered to 
prison authorities some time before April 24, and therefore 
should be deemed filed before the AEDPA effective date. 
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Because the AEDPA does not apply here, the one-year 
period of limitations of the amended S 2244(d) does not bar 
the Petition.1 We repeat that, in this case, the 
Commonwealth had the burden of proving that the Petition 
had been delivered to prison authorities on April 24 and not 
before. It not only failed to meet its burden, it did not even 
see fit to raise this issue in the district court. 
 
III. 
 
A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus 
unless (1) "the applicant has exhausted the remedies 
available in the courts of the State", (2) no such state 
remedy is available or (3) available remedies are ineffective 
to protect the applicant's rights. 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b)(1). To 
exhaust the remedies available in the Pennsylvania courts, 
Henderson must first fairly present to the Pennsylvania 
courts all claims he will make in his Habeas Petition, in 
order to give the state courts "the `opportunity to pass upon 
and correct alleged violations of [his] federal rights.' " See 
Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam) 
(quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). 
Henderson raised one issue in his Petition to the district 
court: "Petitioner did not knowingly and intelligently waive 
his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel." For Henderson to 
have "fairly presented" this issue to the Pennsylvania 
courts, his "state court pleadings and briefs must 
demonstrate that he has presented the legal theory and 
supporting facts asserted in the federal habeas petition in 
such a manner that the claims raised in the state courts 
are substantially equivalent to those asserted in federal 
court." See Doctor, 96 F.3d at 678 (quotation omitted). 
 
The record clearly demonstrates that Henderson, 
following his conviction, "fairly presented" before each level 
of state court hierarchy the issue of the effectiveness of his 
waiver of counsel on his subsequent pro se representation 
at the suppression hearing. App. at 56, 61 (Superior Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Even if the AEDPA applied here, S 2244(d) would not time-bar 
Henderson's Petition because, as this Court recently held, habeas 
petitions need only be filed before April 24, 1997 to be timely under the 
new standard. See Burns, 134 F.3d at 111. 
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of Pennsylvania); id. at 363 (Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania); id. at 85 (Common Pleas Court of Greene 
County). Moreover, the Commonwealth conceded to the 
district court in its Answer to Henderson's Habeas Petition 
that "[t]he petitioner has exhausted his state remedies as to 
the issue of his right to counsel at the suppression hearing, 
albeit under the guise of an assertion of ineffective 
assistance of counsel." App. at 23. 
 
Notwithstanding the district court's rather detailed 
analysis of the nuances of exhaustion--it construed 
Henderson's Petition as raising two Sixth Amendment 
violations, one at the preliminary hearing and another at 
the suppression hearing, and conducted a separate 
exhaustion analysis for each--we are satisfied that 
Henderson has fulfilled the exhaustion requirement. The 
Supreme Court has warned that judges should not misread 
habeas petitions in order to split single claims and conduct 
separate exhaustion analyses for each. Engle v. Isaac, 456 
U.S. 107, 124 n.25 (1982) ("A creative appellate judge could 
almost always distill from these allegations an unexhausted 
. . . claim."). We read the record to indicate that Henderson 
was without counsel at only one critical stage of his 
criminal proceeding--the suppression hearing. His right to 
counsel at this juncture certainly could have been waived, 
but it is the government's burden to demonstrate that such 
a waiver was voluntary, knowing and intelligent. See 
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 403 (1977). That the 
waiver analysis in this case involves two pieces of evidence 
at two different times--a waiver form signed by Henderson 
at the preliminary hearing and his motion to proceed pro se 
filed before the suppression hearing--does not transform 
the single, alleged constitutional deprivation into two 
separate ones. 
 
Any doubt that Henderson raised only a single claim 
before the state courts and again in his Habeas Petition is 
answered by Henderson's Habeas Petition itself, which 
states as the single, simple ground for review,"Petitioner 
did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Sixth 
Amendment Right To Counsel." App. at 11. We reject the 
Commonwealth's attempt to split the claim for exhaustion 
purposes--right to counsel at the preliminary hearing and 
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right to counsel at the suppression hearing--because it was 
the Commonwealth that broached the issue, 
notwithstanding Henderson's simple statement of the issue 
presented. See McMahon v. Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934, 941 
(3d Cir. 1987). The legal memorandum Henderson 
submitted in support of his Petition clarified any ambiguity 
the district court may have had when he wrote of his 
"single constitutional issue" that "[t]he legal claim of invalid 
waiver of counsel at the preliminary hearing is precisely the 
same as invalid waiver of counsel at the suppression 
hearing." 
 
What we said in McMahon, 821 F.2d at 941, may be 
reiterated to control the present matter: 
 
        Though appellant's petition may have been inartfully 
       drafted, it was the Commonwealth, not the petitioner, 
       that construed it as containing more than one claim. 
       We find the record below reveals that [Henderson] 
       clarified any ambiguity with respect to the Petition for 
       a Writ of Habeas Corpus and adequately informed the 
       court that the Petition contained only one issue. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that Henderson properly 
exhausted the issue of his right to counsel at the 
suppression hearing. We turn, then, to the merits of his 
Petition.2 
 
IV. 
 
The Sixth Amendment provides, inter alia:"In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. Const. 
amend. VI; see Bey, 124 F.3d at 528. The right to counsel 
attaches at arraignment, extends through the first appeal 
and guarantees an accused the assistance of counsel at all 
critical stages of a proceeding. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 
344, 357 (1990). A pretrial hearing considering the 
suppression of the defendant's confession is such a critical 
stage because its "results might settle the accused's fate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Because we concluded in Part II supra that the AEDPA does not apply 
to this Petition, we exercise plenary review over the state court 
judgment. 
See Bey, 124 F.3d at 528. 
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and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." See id. at 
358 n.5 (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 
(1967)). 
 
Concomitant with the right to be defended by counsel 
during criminal proceedings is the accused's right to waive 
counsel and proceed pro se. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 
806, 821 (1975). In order to establish that Henderson 
validly waived his right to counsel, the Commonwealth 
bears the heavy burden of proving that the waiver was 
voluntary, knowing and intelligent. See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 
403. The district court determined that Henderson validly 
waived his right to counsel, relying on (1) the waiver form 
which Henderson signed and filed with the district justice 
at the preliminary hearing and (2) the "Petition to Proceed 
on own Behalf " which Henderson filed pro se with the 
Court of Common Pleas before the suppression hearing. 
 
We conclude, however, that these documents alone--the 
generic waiver form unspecific to Henderson's case and a 
Petition which states, almost exclusively, "I wish to proceed 
on my own behalf "--are insufficient to meet the 
Commonwealth's "weighty obligation . . . to prove an 
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right or privilege." App. at 33, 35; see Brewer, 430 U.S. at 
403-404. 
 
To ensure that an accused is aware of the pitfalls 
possible in self-representation, "the district court should 
advise him in unequivocal terms both of the technical 
problems he may encounter in acting as his own attorney 
and of the risks he takes if his defense efforts are 
unsuccessful." See United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 
188 (3d Cir. 1982). As a matter of constitutional law, we 
have imposed a clear and unambiguous obligation upon a 
trial judge who is faced with an accused who states merely 
that he is aware of his right to counsel but wishes to waive 
that right. A statement by a defendant that he wishes to 
proceed pro se is not enough. Signing a pre-printed form is 
not enough. See Piankhy v. Cuyler, 703 F.2d 728, 731 n.4 
(3d Cir. 1983). Whether it be a U.S. District Judge or a U.S. 
Magistrate Judge in a federal prosecution or a state judge 
in a state criminal proceeding, the trial judge must conduct 
a colloquy with the accused to determine that the waiver is 
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not only voluntary, but also knowing and intelligent. Id. At 
a minimum, 
 
       [t]o be valid [a defendant's] waiver must be made with 
       an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the 
       statutory offenses included within them, the range of 
       allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses 
       to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, 
       and all other facts essential to a broad understanding 
       of the whole matter. 
 
Id. at 188-189 (quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 
724 (1948) (plurality opinion) (reversing denial of habeas 
petition because standard, pre-printed waiver of counsel 
form insufficient to satisfy Sixth Amendment)). We have 
held that an accused's protection under the Sixth 
Amendment Right to Counsel is not satisfied when a trial 
judge has failed to conduct "a penetrating and 
comprehensive examination" of the accused's waiver 
attempt which ensures that the accused is knowledgeable 
about his decision, even when the colloquy skips just one 
of the above factors. See Welty, 674 F.2d at 189 (no waiver 
where court merely informed defendant that self- 
representation is "inadvisable") (quoting Von Moltke, 332 
U.S. at 724 (plurality opinion)); see also United States v. 
Moskovits, 86 F.3d 1303, 1308 (3d Cir. 1996) (no waiver 
notwithstanding trial judge's detailed colloquy with 
defendant because judge failed to state that he was 
authorized to impose greater sentence than that imposed in 
defendant's first trial). 
 
In this case, neither the waiver of counsel form nor the 
petition to proceed pro se explained, for example, what 
sentences or fines Henderson could face if convicted, nor 
did they demonstrate Henderson's understanding of"all 
other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole 
matter." See Welty, 674 F.2d at 189 (quoting Von Moltke, 
332 U.S. at 724 (plurality opinion)); see also United States 
v. Salemo, 61 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 1995) (invalid waiver 
where no recorded colloquy, notwithstanding trial judge's 
apparent familiarity with defendant's understanding of legal 
issues in case). As a plurality of the Supreme Court 
described in Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 724,"a mere routine 
inquiry--the asking of several standard questions followed 
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by the signing of a standard written waiver of counsel--may 
leave a judge entirely unaware of the facts essential to an 
informed decision that an accused has executed a valid 
waiver of his right to counsel." A generic waiver form such 
as Henderson's cannot replace the verbal colloquy between 
judge and defendant, set forth for the record, to satisfy the 
judge's obligation to ensure a waiver is made voluntarily, 
knowingly and intelligently. See Singer v. Court of Common 
Pleas, 879 F.2d 1203, 1210 (3d Cir. 1989). We therefore 
conclude that Henderson did not make a valid waiver of his 
right to counsel at the suppression hearing. 
 
The writ of habeas corpus should have been granted. 
 
V. 
 
But this does not end our deliberation. The 
Commonwealth urges that if we issue the writ it should be 
conditioned upon the Commonwealth affording Henderson 
only the opportunity for a new suppression hearing, and 
then conducting a new trial only if his confession is 
suppressed. Henderson suggests otherwise. He argues that 
he should be entitled to not only a new suppression hearing 
but also a new trial before a jury, regardless of the outcome 
of the suppression hearing. To determine what conditions 
should be attached to the grant of the writ, it isfirst 
necessary to determine if we have the authority to condition 
the release on any proceeding less than a new trial, and if 
so, we must decide if we should exercise that authority 
under the circumstances of this case. We begin our 
analysis by addressing the precise nature of federal court 
habeas corpus jurisdiction over petitions emanating from 
criminal convictions in the state court system. 
 
A. 
 
Let there be no misunderstanding that federal habeas 
corpus review of state criminal convictions is an anomaly in 
the jurisprudence of res judicata. It is only in the context 
of a state criminal proceeding that a state court 
determination of federal constitutional law may be 
reexamined anew in the federal court system. Thus, where 
a federal constitutional issue is presented to the state court 
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system in a civil action in a proceeding brought under 42 
U.S.C. S 1983, the Supreme Court has held that Congress 
did not intend "to allow relitigation of federal issues decided 
after a full and fair hearing in a state court simply because 
the state court's decision may have been erroneous." Allen 
v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 (1980). Although the writ of 
habeas corpus is a civil proceeding, at least since 1953 the 
Court has considered it a special exception to this rule. 
Thus in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 500 (1953), Justice 
Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, wrote, "the prior 
State determination of a claim under the United States 
Constitution cannot foreclose consideration of such a claim, 
else the State court would have the final say which 
Congress, by the Act of 1867, provided it should not have." 
Also speaking for the majority, Justice Reed stated,"[t]he 
state adjudication carries the weight that federal practice 
gives to the conclusion of a court of last resort of another 
jurisdiction on federal constitutional issues. It is not res 
judicata." Id. at 458. 
 
If there was difficulty trying to reconcile the philosophy of 
the Brown v. Allen Court in 1953 with the Allen v. McCurry 
Court in 1980, Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court in 
1963 in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430 (1963), carved out 
a sound jurisdictional basis for the present concept of 
federal habeas corpus, stating that, "while our appellate 
function is concerned only with the judgments or decrees of 
state courts, the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the lower 
federal courts is not so confined. The jurisdictional 
prerequisite is not the judgment of a state court but 
detention simpliciter." Therein Justice Brennan emphasized 
that "[h]abeas lies to enforce the right of personal liberty; 
when that right is denied and a person confined, the federal 
court has the power to release him. Indeed, it has no other 
power; it cannot revise the state court judgment; it can act 
only on the body of the petitioner." Id. at 430-431. 
 
With this understanding, and conscious that we are not 
reviewing in ipsis verbis the state court decision but only 
inquiring into detention simpliciter, we lack the ability to 
"revise the state court judgment." It would seem that 
federal habeas power is limited, first, to a determination of 
whether there has been an improper detention by virtue of 
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the state court judgment; and second, if we find such an 
illegal detention, to ordering the immediate release of the 
prisoner, conditioned on the state's opportunity to correct 
constitutional errors that we conclude occurred in the 
initial proceedings. This is not a direct appeal from a 
federal conviction, where upon vacating the judgment this 
Court would have unlimited power to attach conditions to 
the criminal proceedings on remand. See, e.g., United 
States v. Gravatt, 868 F.2d 585, 591 (3d Cir. 1989). Rather, 
this is federal habeas corpus relating to a state conviction. 
 
B. 
 
Our relief must thus be fitted between two principles 
underlying habeas corpus jurisprudence. The first is found 
in the habeas statute itself: "The court shall summarily 
hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as 
law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. S 2243. The second is 
that "[b]oth the historic nature of the writ and principles of 
federalism preclude a federal court's direct interference with 
a state court's conduct of state litigation." See Barry v. 
Brower, 864 F.2d 295, 300 (3d Cir. 1988). Within the 
strictures of these principles, federal courts have most often 
granted the relief in habeas cases that has required the 
least intervention into the state criminal process. Courts 
usually condition the issuance of a writ, which releases the 
body of the prisoner from custody obtained through 
unconstitutional means, upon the state's failure to retry the 
habeas petitioner within a reasonable time in a way that 
comports with constituional dictates. See, e.g., Brewer, 430 
U.S. at 407 n.13. 
 
It is true that under certain circumstances, federal courts 
have conditioned the issuance of a writ on the state's 
conducting proceedings narrower than a full retrial. See 
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 394 (1964) (conditioning 
writ on state court conducting evidentiary hearing to decide 
whether petitioner's confession was voluntary or coerced 
and thus inadmissible at trial, a decision which the state 
court had left for the jury to make in contravention of the 
petitioner's due process rights in the state trial; further 
ordering that if the state court decides the confession was 
coerced, then a new trial would be necessary to avoid the 
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writ). However, such cases make clear that conditional 
writs must be tailored to ensure that all constitutional 
defects will be cured by the satisfaction of that condition. 
The Supreme Court "has repeatedly stated that federal 
courts may delay the release of a successful habeas 
petitioner in order to provide the State an opportunity to 
correct the constitutional violation found by the court." Hilton 
v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987) (emphasis added). 
This Court certainly has the power to condition the writ on 
a new trial. Before we further parse the relief and limit the 
condition to a suppression hearing alone, we must examine 
the nature of the constitutional violation found here in 
order to be sure that simply conducting the new hearing 
will completely eradicate the violation, and to be sure we do 
not "revise the state court judgment." See Faye, 372 U.S. at 
431. 
 
C. 
 
The right to the assistance of counsel granted in the 
Sixth Amendment, including the "correlative right to 
dispense with a lawyer's help", Adams v. United States ex 
rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942), is "one of the 
safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to 
insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty", 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938). This 
constitutional right "withholds from federal courts [and 
from state courts via the Fourteenth Amendment, Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963)], in all criminal 
proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused 
of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance 
of counsel." Johnson, 304 U.S. at 463. Had Henderson been 
deprived of his right to counsel at the trial itself, certainly 
we would require no less than a new trial to prevent a writ 
from issuing. We must decide, however, whether the 
deprivation of counsel at Henderson's suppression cast 
enough taint on the counseled trial itself that we must 
condition the writ on a new trial. We conclude that it did. 
 
This case must first be distinguished from those in which 
a constitutional violation in the state criminal proceedings 
could be corrected by issuing a writ conditioned on 
something less than a whole trial--a hearing, for example. 
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In Jackson, 378 U.S. at 377, 394, the Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional a state criminal trial procedure in which a 
judge was not given the discretion to exclude a defendant's 
confession if a "fair question" existed about its 
voluntariness. Giving the jury the primary responsibility to 
first determine whether the confession was voluntary, and 
second, to discredit involuntary confessions which the jury 
has at that point already heard, violated due process. Id. at 
377. In fashioning a remedy, the Court recognized that the 
defendant was entitled to a hearing in which the 
voluntariness, and hence admissibility, of his confession 
would be determined apart from "the body trying guilt or 
innocence." Id. at 394. The Court concluded: 
 
       So far we agree and hold that he is now entitled to 
       such a hearing in the state court. But if at the 
       conclusion of such an evidentiary hearing in the state 
       court on the coercion issue, it is determined that 
       Jackson's confession was voluntarily given, admissible 
       in evidence, and properly to be considered by the jury, 
       we see no constitutional necessity at that point for 
       proceeding with a new trial, for Jackson has already 
       been tried by a jury with the confession placed before 
       it and has been found guilty. 
 
In that case, because the constitutional violation suffered 
by the habeas petitioner was the lack of a necessary 
hearing, the Court could remedy that defect by ordering a 
constitutional hearing itself. It was the legal outcome of 
that hearing alone--a determination about the 
voluntariness of the confession--that was important. 
Because it had been missing, the Court was able to 
"dispose of the matter as law and justice require," 28 U.S.C. 
S 2243, by granting the narrow relief of ordering the hearing 
itself. 
 
However, the nature of the constitutional violation 
suffered by Henderson is very different than that in 
Jackson. To be sure, the Court there stated that no new 
trial was necessary "for Jackson has already been tried by 
a jury with the confession placed before it and has been 
found guilty." Jackson, 378 U.S. at 394. But the linchpin of 
the Court's decision in Jackson, and the sole issue argued 
and decided there, was not the Sixth Amendment Right to 
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Counsel present in this case, but a determination that "a 
conviction based upon a coerced confession . . . cannot 
withstand constitutional attack under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 377. There is 
a completely different issue presented here, and it is one 
that requires a completely different analysis. When 
Henderson was deprived of his Sixth Amendment Right to 
Counsel at the suppression hearing, he lost much more 
than an opportunity to have his confession suppressed-- 
the legal outcome of that hearing. Rather, the constitutional 
defect he suffered in the first suppression hearing was a 
procedural, structural defect which may have had 
repercussions in plea bargaining, discovery and trial 
strategy that would not be cured by a new suppression 
hearing alone. This is a much more sophisticated right and 
its analysis must always begin where the due process 
determination leaves off. 
 
The importance of "the guiding hand of counsel at every 
step in the proceedings against him," Powell v. Alabama, 
287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932), cannot be understated. First, 
representation by counsel in the stages leading up to trial 
is beneficial to the defendant who may wish to pursue his 
plea bargaining options and avoid trial altogether. See 
Grades v. Boles, 398 F.2d 409, 413 (4th Cir. 1968) 
("Counsel, or effective waiver thereof, is a sine qua non of 
permissible plea bargaining."). Second, "trained counsel can 
more effectively discover the case the State has against his 
client and make possible the preparation of a proper 
defense to meet that case at the trial." See Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970). Third, "the skilled 
interrogation of witnesses [at a pretrial hearing] by an 
experienced lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment tool for 
use in cross-examination of the State's witnesses at the 
trial, or preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a 
witness who does not appear at the trial." Id. Particularly 
here, where three of the four witnesses to testify at the 
suppression hearing testified at Henderson's trial, see App. 
at 159, 213, the participation of a skilled attorney at both 
proceedings certainly would have been beneficial to 
Henderson's ultimate defense. Henderson suffered a 
constitutional deprivation that went to the heart of the 
criminal trial process itself, a violation which cannot be 
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remedied by merely ordering a new suppression hearing 
and conditioning a new trial on its sheer outcome alone. Cf. 
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 47-50 (1984) (in non-habeas 
case reviewing state criminal convictions, where defendants 
failed to have wiretap evidence suppressed in a closed 
pretrial hearing that violated the Sixth Amendment's public 
trial guarantee and were convicted at trial, the Court 
remanded for new suppression hearing only; however, the 
Court stressed that the outcome of such hearings often 
replaced the importance of the trial itself and the Court did 
not indicate any way in which the procedure and conduct 
of the suppression hearing, other than its sheer outcome 
alone, would affect the trial or any other part of the 
proceedings in that case). 
 
Moreover, the value of counsel to Henderson at the 
hearing must be underscored because the hearing 
concerned what was undoubtedly the most damaging piece 
of evidence offered against Henderson at trial: his 
confession. Of course, that Henderson failed to have his 
confession suppressed in no way precluded his attack on 
the credibility of the confession at trial. See Crane v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). The judge may not 
have ruled as a matter of law that the confession was 
inadmissible, but had a skilled attorney represented 
Henderson at the suppression hearing, he or she would 
have confronted the witnesses against Henderson and 
studied the Commonwealth's trial strategy, in the hopes of 
preparing a better attack on the factual environment of the 
confession at a trial by jury. See id. at 691; Dancy v. United 
States, 361 F.2d 75, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("defense counsel's 
conduct of the cross-examination of witnesses at the trial 
reflects a tentative and probing approach due to his 
ignorance of certain doubtful areas in the government's 
proof which might well have been known to him had he 
been able to participate in the preliminary hearing"). 
 
D. 
 
Finally, we decide that the deprivation of Henderson's 
right to counsel at the suppression hearing is one of the 
"structural defects in the constitution of the trial 
mechanism, which defy analysis by `harmless-error' 
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standards." See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 
(1991); see also Salemo, 61 F.3d at 221-222 (refusing to 
conduct harmless error analysis to Sixth Amendment 
violation at sentencing hearing); United States v. Allen, 895 
F.2d 1577, 1580 (10th Cir. 1990) (harmless error analysis 
inapplicable to waiver of counsel cases); United States v. 
Bohn, 890 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1989) (harmless error 
analysis inappropriate when defendant denied right to 
counsel at in camera hearing).3 The existence of structural 
defects, including deprivation of the right to counsel at the 
trial itself, "requires automatic reversal of the conviction 
because they infect the entire trial process." Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-630 (1993). On the other 
hand, mere "trial errors," which usually "occur during the 
presentation of the case to the jury," are "amenable to 
harmless-error analysis" because they "may . .. be 
quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence 
presented in order to determine [the effect they had on the 
trial]." Id. at 629 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-308). 
 
Violations of the right to counsel may not always be 
structural defects which allow a reviewing court to bypass 
harmless error analysis, see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 
275, 282-283 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring), but 
harmless error analysis should never be applied where, as 
here, "deprivation of the right to counsel affected--and 
contaminated--the entire criminal proceeding", Satterwhite 
v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257 (1988). We are convinced that 
the absence of counsel at Henderson's suppression hearing, 
which handicapped Henderson during the remainder of the 
proceedings against him and especially injured his 
attorney's ability to argue the facts of his confession to the 
jury at trial, contaminated the entire criminal proceeding in 
this case. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. But see United States v. Mills, 895 F.2d 897, 904 (2d Cir. 1990) (even 
though defendant suffered right to counsel violation when denied 
opportunity to make closing argument pro se in hearing to suppress 
defendant's incriminating statements, violation was harmless error 
because, after motion to suppress was denied, government did not 
introduce statements at trial); Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d 753, 757 
(5th Cir. 1984) (even if waiver of counsel was invalid, error was 
harmless). 
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n.25 (1984) ("The Court has uniformly found constitutional 
error without any showing of prejudice when counsel was 
either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the 
accused during a critical stage of the proceeding."). The 
effect of this determination is that prejudice is presumed by 
the fact of the constitutional error itself. 
 
E. 
 
The sum of these factors--that the deprivation of counsel 
from Henderson's suppression hearing was a procedural, 
structural defect, that Henderson has the right to introduce 
facts at trial in an effort to attack the credibility of the 
confession and the impropriety of a harmless error analysis 
here--leads us to conclude that the constitutional violation 
suffered by Henderson will not be corrected absent a new 
trial. 
 
Moreover, we repeat for emphasis that the conclusion we 
reach today does not run counter to the teachings of the 
Supreme Court or prior decisions of this court. First, the 
views stated here do not conflict with the holding or 
teachings of Jackson v. Denno, which did not address the 
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel but discussed only a 
due process violation. The full guarantee of the Sixth 
Amendment gives the defendant the right to make proper 
preparation for trial on the basis of testimony adduced at 
the suppression hearing, irrespective of the outcome of the 
hearing, a constitutional issue that was neither argued nor 
decided by the Court in Jackson. In contrast to the jury in 
Jackson, which arguably knew too much (and was harmed 
by what it knew), the jury in this case had too little 
information. What is at stake here is the opportunity of 
counsel to utilize at a subsequent trial any information he 
may have obtained at the suppression hearing. Nor do we 
think that our view is contrary to the teachings and 
holdings of cases in this court. For example, in United 
States ex rel. Harvin v. Yeager, 428 F.2d 1354, 1358-1359 
(3d Cir. 1970), United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 
414 F.2d 552, 560 (3d Cir. 1969), and United States ex rel. 
Dickerson v. Rundle, 363 F.2d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 1966), we 
found due process violations where each state prisoner was 
denied a Jackson hearing. We have already decided that 
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due process requires a very different analysis than the 
correction of a Sixth Amendment deprivation. Moreover, in 
Yeager, 428 F.2d at 1359, we conditioned the writ on a new 
Jackson hearing in which the state court would decide 
whether the prisoner's statement at issue was voluntary 
and hence admissible, but stated that even if the state 
courts "hold the statement admissible, they may still 
consider the possibility of granting a new trial, especially if 
there is any substantial difference between the evidence 
presented at the new hearing and that which had been 
submitted to the jury at the trial." 
 
Second, in no way do we ignore the teachings of Brecht, 
507 U.S. at 637, which mandates that habeas relief be used 
only "to afford relief to those whom society has`grievously 
wronged' " and not when there is a mere "reasonable 
possibility" of harm to the petitioner. Here, we have not 
suggested a mere possibility that the verdict was tainted by 
constitutional error; we have found a real constitutional 
error--to wit, a violation of the Sixth Amendment Right to 
Counsel--one that substantially undermines our confidence 
in the reliability of the trial. 
 
Third, we do not disregard the teachings of Waller, 467 
U.S. at 50, where the defendant was given a suppression 
hearing that was closed to the public in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a public trial. Obviously, 
the violation in that case was easily cured by ordering a 
new public suppression hearing. In this case, the Sixth 
Amendment Right to Counsel will simply not be cured by 
ordering a new suppression hearing alone because the 
effect of the constitutional error spilled over into the trial 
itself. 
 
Therefore, although we possess the power to attach 
conditions other than according a successful habeas 
petitioner a new trial, we should not do so here. We are not 
prepared to rule as a matter of law that a lawyer who 
represents a defendant at an unsuccessful suppression 
hearing will always be unable, as a result of that hearing, 
to uncover facts or develop strategy that will ultimately 
benefit his or her client at trial. Holding that Henderson is 
entitled only to a new suppression hearing and not a new 
trial would be to rule just that. If the confession is not 
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suppressed after a new hearing, all that will have been 
decided is that there was no illegality in the 
Commonwealth's obtaining the confession. This ruling of 
law would not deny the defendant's right to raise questions 
of fact and credibility to the jury relating to the putative 
confession. This is the opportunity that the Sixth 
Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant in a "trial, by 
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed". U.S. Const. amend. VI. It is for 
efforts like this that the same Amendment affirms and 
attests his right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence." 
 
* * * * * * * * * 
 
We have considered all contentions of the parties and 
have concluded that no further discussion is necessary. 
 
The judgment of the district court will be reversed and 
the proceedings remanded to the district court for entry of 
a writ of habeas corpus, which shall be conditioned upon 
the Commonwealth affording petitioner a new hearing on 
his motion to suppress his confession and, if the 
Commonwealth still wishes to pursue the charges, a new 
trial that will abide the decision reached following the 
suppression hearing. 
 
                                22 
  
GARTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I agree with the majority of the court that: (1) the AEDPA 
does not apply in this case, (2) Henderson has exhausted 
his claims, (3) the uncounseled suppression hearing 
 949<!>conducted by the Court of Common Pleas violated 
 
Henderson's constitutional rights, and (4) we are therefore 
obliged to order the district court to issue the writ of 
habeas corpus. I part company with the panel majority on 
the one substantial issue in this appeal: the remedy that 
must be afforded Henderson "to correct the constitutional 
violation found by the court." Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 
770, 775 (1987). Because I feel strongly that the majority's 
analysis is deeply flawed on this point, I feel compelled to 
dissent and to explain my views in some depth. 
 
The majority of the panel holds that the writ to be issued 
must grant Henderson a new trial, even though neither 
Henderson nor the panel majority claims that the 
constitutional defect at issue extended beyond the 
uncounseled suppression hearing to the trial itself. I, on the 
other hand, relying on Supreme Court and Third Circuit 
authority, would hold that the writ should be conditioned 
only on the grant of a counseled and therefore 
constitutional suppression hearing. 
 
I reach this conclusion because the Supreme Court so 
held in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). In Jackson, 
the Supreme Court ruled 5 to 4 that, because a new 
suppression hearing could cure the constitutional wrong 
entirely and minimized the federal intrusion into state 
sovereignty, the habeas writ need only direct that a new 
suppression hearing be held to determine whether the 
confession was voluntary. Thus, a new trial was not 
required. See id. at 394-95. The Supreme Court has stood 
by this rule. See, e.g., Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 544 
(1966). Our court has applied the rule in several cases as 
well, and has in each case limited the habeas relief to a 
new suppression hearing to determine whether the 
confession was in fact voluntary. See, e.g., United States ex 
rel. Harvin v. Yeager, 428 F.2d 1354, 1358-59 (3d Cir. 
1970) (ordering district court to issue writ conditioned on 
grant of suppression hearing); United States ex rel. 
Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 560 (3d Cir. 1969) 
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(same); United States ex rel. Dickerson v. Rundle, 363 F.2d 
126, 130 (3d Cir. 1966) (same). 
 
Today the majority has veered away from this well- 
established line of cases. In the view of the panel majority, 
a suppression hearing alone is insufficient because it would 
not completely cure the constitutional wrong, and because 
it might unduly interfere with state sovereignty. Maj. Op. at 
15-22. 
 
Absent Jackson and its progeny, I would still disagree 
with the majority. Awarding Henderson a new trial in the 
event that his confession is once again ruled admissible 
"provide[s] a totally unjustifiable windfall to a petitioner 
who has not been injured by the actions of which[ ]he 
complains." Koski v. Samaha, 648 F.2d 790, 798 (1st Cir. 
1981). After all, Henderson has not challenged the 
constitutional adequacy of his trial, at which he testified to 
the circumstances surrounding his confession. Granting 
Henderson a bonus new trial based on the "possibility" that 
constitutional error might have contributed to his trial even 
if his confession were properly admitted "is at odds with the 
historic meaning of habeas corpus." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). 
 
Because the Supreme Court has already rejected the 
majority's argument in Jackson, however, I am compelled to 
raise a much more serious objection. I believe that the 
majority's efforts to finesse and distinguish Jackson v. 
Denno is a complete derogation of Supreme Court 
authority. Supreme Court judgments are always superior to 
our own. Because the Supreme Court has already 
considered and rejected the view that the Constitution 
requires a new trial to be granted in such circumstances, 
and our court has faithfully applied these precepts before in 
several cases, I believe the majority's resolution of this case 
is contrary not only to good sense, but established law. Its 
fanciful speculation as to the impact that Henderson's 
unconstitutional suppression hearing might have had on 
his trial has unjustifiably disregarded both state 
prerogatives and the jurisprudence of both the Supreme 
Court and the Third Circuit. 
 
Under Jackson v. Denno, Henderson is constitutionally 
entitled to no more than a counseled suppression hearing. 
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If his motion to suppress is again denied, that ends it. "Of 
course, if the state court, at an evidentiary hearing, 
redetermines the facts and decides that [Henderson]'s 
confession was involuntary, there must be a new trial on 
guilt or innocence without the confession's being admitted 
in evidence." Jackson, 378 U.S. at 394. Because the 
majority has refused to recognize the Supreme Court's 
teaching, I dissent from the remedy afforded to Henderson 
by the court. 
 
A. 
 
Jackson v. Denno 
 
In Jackson v. Denno, the Supreme Court invalidated a 
New York criminal procedure by which the voluntariness of 
confessions was submitted to the jury with appropriate 
instructions. The habeas petitioner in that case, Jackson, 
had been charged with murder and had confessed in 
circumstances indicating that the confession might have 
been involuntary. Following New York procedure, the state 
trial judge admitted the confession in evidence at trial. 
Jackson then took the stand in his defense and recounted 
the circumstances of his confession. He was then cross- 
examined by the prosecution. Following closing arguments, 
the trial court submitted the issue of the confession's 
voluntariness to the jury. The jury was told that"if it found 
the confession involuntary, it was to disregard it entirely, 
and determine guilt or innocence solely from the other 
evidence in the case; alternatively, if it found the confession 
voluntary, it was to determine its truth or reliability and 
afford it weight accordingly." 378 U.S. at 374-75. 
 
The Supreme Court, per Justice White, invalidated the 
procedure on the basis that the New York procedure did not 
adequately safeguard the defendant's "right to be free of a 
conviction based upon a coerced confession." Id. at 377. 
The problem, quite simply, was that juries were likely to 
believe that even coerced confessions were truthful. 
Accordingly, jurors were likely to convict defendants on the 
basis of coerced confessions despite the instruction to 
disregard such confessions. See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 
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U.S. 341, 347 (1981) (discussing Jackson). The Court 
concluded that the procedure's failure to provide"a reliable 
determination of the voluntariness of the confession" meant 
that it could not "withstand constitutional attack under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Jackson, 378 U.S. at 377. 
 
The Court then turned to the proper remedy, and 
confronted the issue that divides the panel today. The issue 
was this: when a state conviction is based on a confession 
that was admitted in evidence pursuant to a 
constitutionally flawed procedure, does the Constitution 
require a federal habeas court to enter a writ conditioned 
on an entirely new trial, or merely a writ conditioned on the 
state conducting a proper suppression hearing? 
 
A majority of the Supreme Court chose the latter. Justice 
White, writing for the majority, agreed that the habeas 
petitioner was entitled to "an adequate [suppression] 
hearing productive of reliable results concerning the 
voluntariness of the confession." Id. at 394. However, he 
wrote, "[i]t does not follow . . . that Jackson is automatically 
entitled to a complete new trial including a retrial of the 
issue of guilt or innocence." Id. According to Justice White: 
 
       [I]f at the conclusion of such an evidentiary hearing . . . 
       it is determined that Jackson's confession was 
       voluntarily given, admissible in evidence, and properly 
       to be considered by the jury, we see no constitutional 
       necessity at that point for proceeding with a new trial, 
       for Jackson has already been tried by a jury with the 
       confession placed before it and has been found guilty. 
       . . . [W]e cannot say that the Constitution requires a 
       new trial if in a soundly conducted collateral 
       proceeding, the confession which was admitted at the 
       trial is fairly determined to be voluntary. 
 
Id. at 394-96 (emphasis added). If the confession was in 
fact voluntary, the Court held, a new trial was not required 
because the state's procedure would have created"no 
constitutional prejudice" to the defendant: "If the jury relied 
on [the voluntary confession], it was entitled to do so." Id. 
at 394. "Obviously, the State is free to give Jackson a new 
trial if it so chooses," Justice White added,"but for us to 
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impose this requirement before the outcome of the new 
hearing on voluntariness is known would not comport with 
the interests of sound judicial administration and the proper 
relationship between federal and state courts." Id. at 395 
(emphasis added). 
 
In separate dissents, Justice Black and Justice Clark 
each attacked the majority's conclusion that a new 
suppression hearing was sufficient to correct the 
constitutional violation. According to Justice Clark, a 
suppression hearing alone "d[id] not cure the error which 
the Court finds present." Id. at 426 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
Justice Black agreed, deeming the court's remedy a 
"fragmentizing" device that had improperly succeeded in 
"sustaining convictions and denying defendants a new trial 
where all the facts are heard together." Id. at 410 (Black, J. 
dissenting). 
 
B. 
 
Henderson v. Frank 
 
The habeas petitioner in this case, John Henderson, was 
also charged with a crime and confessed in circumstances 
that raised the possibility that the confession was coerced. 
Like Jackson, Henderson was unconstitutionally denied "an 
adequate evidentiary hearing productive of reliable results 
concerning the voluntariness of his confession." Jackson, 
378 U.S. at 394. In Henderson's case, his hearing was 
inadequate because his right to the assistance of counsel, 
a constitutional right "essential to a fair trial," Gideon v. 
Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963), was denied. As was 
the case with Jackson, Henderson's confession was 
nonetheless admitted in evidence at trial, where Henderson 
was represented by counsel.1 Like Jackson, Henderson took 
the stand in his own defense at trial and explained to the 
jury that his confession was coerced.2  Like Jackson, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. As noted, Henderson has not challenged the constitutionality of his 
trial. 
 
2. Henderson told the jury that the officers handcuffed him to a chair, 
threatened him, told him what to write down in the confession, and 
failed to read Henderson his Miranda rights. App. 303-06 (trial 
transcript). 
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Henderson was then cross-examined by the prosecution. 
App. 316. As was the case in Jackson's trial, the trial judge 
in Henderson's case instructed the jury "that you must 
disregard the confession or the statement unless you are 
satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence . . . that the 
defendant made the statement voluntarily. . . . If you find 
that the defendant made the statement voluntarily, .. . 
then you may consider it as evidence against him." App. 
341-42. Like Jackson, Henderson was found guilty. 
 
The majority of this court has properly concluded that 
Henderson's constitutional right to the assistance of 
counsel was violated when he was permitted to proceed in 
his suppression hearing pro se without adequate waiver of 
counsel. See Maj. Op. 9-12. In holding that the right to the 
assistance of counsel was so fundamental to a fair trial that 
it was guaranteed to state defendants by the Due Process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court 
in Gideon described the intolerable unreliability of 
uncounseled proceedings: 
 
       If charged with crime, [the layman] is incapable, 
       generally, of determining for himself whether the 
       indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the 
       rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he 
       may be put on trial without a proper charge, and 
       convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence 
       irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He 
       lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to 
       prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect 
       one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every 
       step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though 
       he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction 
       because he does not know how to establish his 
       innocence. 
 
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45, 68-69, 53 S. Ct. 55, 64 (1932)). The panel majority 
properly follows our precedent in determining that the trial 
judge's failure to ensure that Henderson adequately waived 
his right to counsel violated those same rights, and 
permitted Henderson to engage in a critical suppression 
hearing without "the skill and knowledge adequately to 
prepare his defense." Id. That failure denied Henderson that 
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"to which he is constitutionally entitled--an adequate 
evidentiary hearing productive of reliable results concerning 
the voluntariness of his confession," Jackson, 378 U.S. at 
394--much like Jackson. 
 
Where the majority diverges from precedent is in its 
determination of the proper remedy. Instead of following 
Justice White's majority opinion in Jackson v. Denno, the 
panel majority sides with the dissenting Justices in that 
case and rules that the Constitution requires our court to 
order a writ conditioned on the grant of an entirely new 
trial, rather a writ conditioned on the grant of a 
suppression hearing alone. The panel majority offers two 
reasons for its conclusion, both of which were categorically 
rejected by the Supreme Court in Jackson. 
 
First, the panel majority adopts Justice Clark's dissent 
and rules that a new trial is required because "merely to 
have the trial judge hold a hearing on the admissibility of 
the confession . . . does not cure the error which the Court 
finds present." Jackson, 378 U.S. at 426 (Clark, J., 
dissenting). The panel majority reasons that if a proper 
(counseled) suppression hearing had been held, it might 
have had "repercussions in plea bargaining, discovery and 
trial strategy that would not be cured by a new suppression 
hearing alone." Maj. Op. at 17. "[H]ad a skilled attorney 
represented Henderson at the suppression hearing," the 
majority speculates, "he or she would have confronted the 
witnesses against Henderson and studied the 
Commonwealth's trial strategy, in the hopes of preparing a 
better attack on the factual environment of the confession 
at a trial by jury." Maj. Op. at 18. Accordingly,"the 
constitutional violation suffered by Henderson will not be 
corrected absent a new trial." Maj. Op. at 20. 
 
Whatever merit one may find in the majority's view-- and 
I, for one, find none-- it should be enough for us as an 
inferior court that this position was litigated before the 
Supreme Court, and that it lost. The Supreme Court 
explicitly rejected the view that "the constitutional violation 
suffered by [the petitioner] will not be corrected absent a 
new trial," Maj. Op. at 20, and instead adopted the view 
that when the voluntariness of a defendant's confession is 
determined in violation of the defendant's rights,"there is 
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no constitutional prejudice . . . if the confession is now 
properly found to be voluntary and therefore admissible. If 
the jury relied upon it, it was entitled to do so." Jackson, 
378 U.S. at 394. 
 
In so ruling, the Supreme Court rejected the panel 
majority's view that a suppression hearing alone was 
insufficient to cure the wrong because the petitioner's 
position at trial might have been stronger had there been a 
proper suppression hearing before the trial. Such`what if 's 
do not rise to the level of "constitutional prejudice," the 
Court ruled, and thus are inappropriate bases for habeas 
relief. Id. This view is entirely consistent with the remainder 
of the Court's habeas jurisprudence, which has stressed 
that "granting habeas relief merely because there is a 
`reasonable possibility' that [the verdict was tainted by 
constitutional error] is at odds with the historic meaning of 
habeas corpus." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 
(1993) (internal citations omitted). See also Barefoot v. 
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983) ("The role of federal 
habeas proceedings . . . is secondary and limited."). In other 
words, fashioning habeas relief based on unsupported 
speculation as to how a constitutional suppression hearing 
might have affected the petitioner's trial strategy would 
improperly "provide a totally unjustifiable windfall to a 
petitioner who has not been injured by the actions of which 
[the petitioner] complains." Koski v. Samaha, 648 F.2d 790, 
798 (1st Cir. 1981).3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The continuing viability of Jackson's conclusion that a 
constitutionally 
proper suppression hearing cures the constitutional wrong when the 
original hearing was conducted in violation of the defendant's rights is 
illustrated by the Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in Waller v. 
Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 50 (1984). In Waller, the Court held that a 
suppression hearing that (pursuant to a motion by the state) was closed 
to the public violated the defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights to a public trial. On direct review, the Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction, but concluded that a new trial was not required. Justice 
Powell wrote that "the remedy should be appropriate to the violation. If, 
after a new suppression hearing, essentially the same evidence is 
suppressed, a new trial presumably would be a windfall for the 
defendant, and not in the public interest." Id. at 50 (citing Jackson, 378 
U.S. at 394-96). A new trial was necessary "only if a [constitutionally 
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Second, the majority suggests still another reason for its 
view that a new trial is required. According to the panel 
majority, we should be concerned that ordering a 
suppression hearing alone might improperly exceed a 
federal court's authority by improperly "revis[ing] the state 
court judgment." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 431 (1963). 
See also Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 295, 300 (3d Cir. 1988) 
("Both the historic nature of the writ and principles of 
federalism preclude a federal court's direct interference with 
a state court's conduct of state litigation.") Maj. Op. at 14, 
15. Although the majority never quite fleshes out how this 
could be the case, the idea that limiting the remedy to a 
suppression hearing might interfere with the state's 
sovereignty is astounding in light of Jackson  and our own 
precedents.4 In Jackson, the Court held that it was limited 
to ordering a suppression hearing because ordering a full 
trial would interfere with the state's sovereignty. See 
Jackson, 378 U.S. at 395 ("[F]or us to impose th[e] 
requirement [of a new trial] . . . would not comport with the 
proper relationship between federal and state courts."); see 
also id. at 427 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing the 
majority's limited remedy as its "one bow to federalism"). 
Thus, the majority has suggested that it might be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
proper] suppression hearing results in the suppression of material 
evidence not suppressed at the first trial, or in some other material 
change in the positions of the parties." Id. 
 
The fact that the Court concluded that a new suppression hearing 
cured the constitutional wrong on direct review in Waller is especially 
strong evidence that a new trial is an inappropriate remedy here. The 
Supreme Court has often stressed that the writ of habeas corpus is an 
extraordinary remedy, and that "an error that may justify reversal on 
direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final 
judgment." Brecht, 507 U.S. at 634. Given the much freer hand courts 
have in remedying constitutional wrongs on direct review, the fact that 
the unanimous court believed that a new trial was unnecessary on direct 
review in Waller strongly reinforces the conclusion in Jackson that it is 
unnecessary on habeas review. 
 
4. See United States ex rel. Harvin v. Yeager , 428 F.2d 1354, 1358-59 (3d 
Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 
560 (3d Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Dickerson v. Rundle, 363 F.2d 
126, 130 (3d Cir. 1966). 
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constitutionally forbidden to do what the Supreme Court 
ruled it was constitutionally required to do-- condition the 
writ on the grant of a suppression hearing only. 5 I am at a 
loss to understand how this could be true. 
 
C. 
 
Distinguishing Jackson 
 
The panel majority attempts to distinguish Jackson v. 
Denno by reeling off a list of "factors" that it claims makes 
Henderson's case "very different"-- even "completely 
different"-- from Jackson. The "sum of these factors," the 
majority proclaims, makes Jackson distinguishable and a 
new trial necessary to cure the constitutional wrong. Maj. 
Op. at 20. An examination of these "factors" shows that 
they each applied with equal force to Jackson v. Denno, and 
thus fail to provide any possible basis from which Jackson 
can be distinguished. 
 
1. 
 
The weakest of the majority's arguments that Jackson is 
distinguishable is that the denial of a Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel is generally considered a structural defect 
rather than a trial error under the framework provided by 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). 
 
I completely agree that the uncounseled suppression 
hearing suffered by Henderson was a structural defect in 
his trial. The problem is that the constitutional error in 
Jackson v. Denno was also a structural defect, for exactly 
the same reason: without conducting a new hearing, there 
was no way to determine how heavily constitutional error 
weighed into the jury's verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 629. 
In fact, in the two cases in which the Supreme Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The patent weakness of the majority's suggestion that a limited 
remedy might improperly "revise the state court judgment," Fay v. Noia, 
372 U.S. 391, 431 (1963), is further illustrated by the fact that Justice 
Brennan, the author of Fay v. Noia, provided the fifth vote for the 
majority in Jackson one year later. 
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considered unconstitutional suppression proceedings and 
ruled that a new trial was not required to remedy the 
wrong, the errors were both structural defects. See 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310 (noting that the error in Waller 
v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 50 (1984)6  was a structural defect 
that "affect[ed] the framework within the trial proceeds, 
rather than simply an error in the trial process itself ").7 
 
The error in the majority's analysis is that Fulminante's 
"structural defect"/ "trial error" doctrine is used exclusively 
to gauge whether a reviewing court needs to grant relief at 
all following a constitutional error. If the error is a 
structural defect, the court must grant relief; if it is a trial 
error, the court need not grant relief unless the admission 
of the tainted evidence "had substantial and injurious effect 
or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht, 507 
U.S. at 631 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 
776 (1946) (habeas)). Once the court has determined that it 
must grant relief, however, and turns to the separate 
question of what relief must be granted, the"structural 
defect"/"trial error" distinction drops out of the analysis 
and becomes completely irrelevant. Accordingly, the panel 
majority's emphasis on the fact that the constitutional 
wrong is a structural defect answers a question that has 
not been asked. It provides no guidance or help in 
determining what remedy is required to cure the 
constitutional defect. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Discussed in note 3, supra. 
 
7. Because Jackson was decided before the Supreme Court first 
introduced the harmless error doctrine in Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18 (1967), and nearly a quarter century before Fulminante 
formalized the distinction between structural defects and trial errors, 
the 
Jackson opinion could not actually state that its error was a structural 
defect. However, we can be confident that the error in Jackson was a 
structural defect because 1) the Fulminante court specifically held that a 
nearly identical error in Waller was a structural defect, see Fulminante, 
499 U.S. at 310, and 2) the error in Jackson was not something that 
could be "quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence 
presented in order to determine the effect it had on the trial." Brecht, 
507 U.S. at 629. 
 
Notably, the majority has not made any argument that the error in 
Jackson was not a structural defect. 
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2. 
 
The majority also argues that this case is different from 
Jackson because the defect in Jackson was not the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel present in this case, but 
rather a determination that "a conviction based upon a 
coerced confession . . . cannot withstand constitutional 
attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Maj. Op. at 17 (quoting Jackson, 378 U.S. at 
377) (ellipsis in majority opinion). This, we are told, is a 
"completely different issue . . . that requires a completely 
different analysis." Id. 
 
The flaw in this argument begins with the majority's 
gross misuse of ellipses to mischaracterize the holding of 
Jackson. The effect of the selective quotation is to foster the 
impression that the issue in Jackson was whether a 
confession was coerced, rather than, as here, whether a 
reliable evidentiary procedure was followed so that the 
defendant's rights to a fair trial were upheld. The entire 
sentence from which the majority selectively quotes is as 
follows: 
 
       In our view, the New York procedure employed in this 
       case did not afford a reliable determination of the 
       voluntariness of the confession offered in evidence at 
       the trial, did not adequately protect Jackson's right to 
       be free of a conviction based upon a coerced confession 
       and therefore cannot withstand constitutional attack 
       under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
       Amendment. 
 
Jackson, 378 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added). As this 
quotation shows, the constitutional error in Jackson was 
not that Jackson's "conviction [was] based upon a coerced 
confession," as the majority states, but that the procedure 
"did not afford a reliable determination of the voluntariness 
of the confession" so that there was a substantial risk that 
Jackson's conviction was based upon a coerced profession. 
 
As a matter of substance, the constitutional wrongs in 
the two cases were the same: the petitioners' confessions 
were determined in unreliable proceedings. Granted, the 
sources of the unreliability are different: in Jackson, the 
concern was that jurors would be unable to follow the 
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judge's instructions, whereas here, our concern is that a 
defendant proceeding without a lawyer would be unable to 
defend his case. The substance of the constitutional wrongs 
is the same, however: in both cases, the voluntariness of 
the confessions was the issue. Because the proceedings in 
which the voluntariness of the confessions was determined 
were unfair and unreliable, we just cannot be sure that the 
petitioners' convictions were based on voluntary 
confessions. 
 
Finally, the constitutional wrongs are identical as a 
matter of form. Both wrongs are violations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which 
guarantees to state criminal defendants those federal 
guarantees listed in the Bill of Rights that are "fundamental 
and essential to a fair trial." Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340. The 
majority concedes that this was the wrong identified in 
Jackson, but then tries to pin the constitutional violation 
here on the Sixth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth. 
Maj. Op. at 16-17, 21. However, Sixth Amendment 
guarantees apply to state proceedings only insofar as the 
Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes 
them. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345. Therefore, this alleged 
difference is an illusion. 
 
3. 
 
The third and final "factor" that the majority lists as a 
ground for distinguishing Jackson is that the denial of 
counsel at Henderson's suppression hearing "may have had 
repercussions in plea bargaining, discovery, and trial 
strategy." Maj. Op. at 17. The participation of a skilled 
attorney at the suppression hearing "would have been 
beneficial to Henderson's defense," we are told, because it 
might have revealed weaknesses in the Commonwealth's 
case that could have only been uncovered in a pre-trial 
proceeding. Maj. Op. at 17. Even if the judge ruled that the 
confession was inadmissible, "a skilled attorney . . . would 
have confronted the witnesses against Henderson and 
studied the Commonwealth's trial strategy, in the hopes of 
preparing a better attack on the factual environment of the 
confession at a trial by jury." Id. at 18. This contrasts with 
Jackson, we are instructed, because in Jackson the only 
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harm suffered by the habeas petitioner was the absence of 
"an opportunity to have his confession suppressed-- the 
legal outcome of that hearing." Id. at 17. Thus, the majority 
claims that the jury in Henderson's trial "had too little 
information," whereas the jury in Jackson"arguably knew 
too much." Id. at 20. 
 
Here the majority has manufactured a difference between 
the two cases by comparing apples and oranges: the 
possibility of actual prejudice in Henderson's case, as 
compared with the reality of constitutional prejudice in 
Jackson. If we apply the same scrutiny to both cases, 
however, we see that the reason stated for distinguishing 
Henderson's case from Jackson actually applies with equal 
force (or lack thereof) to Jackson's case. 
 
In terms of actual prejudice, both Jackson and 
Henderson suffered a missed opportunity to "confront[ ] the 
witnesses against [them] and [to] stud[y] the 
Commonwealth's trial strategy [before trial], in the hopes of 
preparing a better attack on the factual environment of the 
confession at a trial by jury." Id. at 18. Neither petitioner 
was given an adequate opportunity to probe the 
prosecution's case against him until the trial itself, where 
all attempts to challenge the voluntariness of the 
confessions failed. If anything, Henderson fared 
substantially better on this count than did Jackson: at least 
Henderson's lawyer had available to him at trial a 
transcript of Henderson's uncounseled suppression 
hearing. In Henderson's case, this benefit was substantial, 
because Henderson managed to delve into the 
circumstances of his confession in substantially more depth 
than did Henderson's counsel at trial. In fact, the transcript 
of the uncounseled suppression hearing runs 54 pages; 
Henderson's entire defense, by comparison, is contained on 
only 21 pages.8 
 
In contrast, Jackson had no opportunity whatsoever to 
probe the prosecution's case before trial. If the majority is 
right that such missed opportunities to gain tactical 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Compare App. 158-211 (uncounseled suppression hearing) with App. 
298-319 (trial). Of course, the adequacy of Henderson's trial counsel is 
not at issue in this petition. 
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advantage are constitutionally relevant, then the case in 
which the absence of such opportunities most cries out for 
constitutional relief is Jackson's, not Henderson's. Cf. 
Jackson, 378 U.S. at 426 (Clark, J., dissenting) . 
 
But of course the majority is not right. Jackson rejected 
the view that such possibilities were relevant, and instead 
adopted the view that there was "no constitutional 
prejudice" so long as a subsequent suppression hearing 
later revealed that the confession relied upon by the jury 
was properly before it. Id. at 394. In distinguishing between 
actual prejudice and constitutional prejudice, the Court 
reasonably tailored the constitutional remedy to the 
constitutional wrong. Because defendants do not have a 
constitutional right to an opportunity to gain a tactical 
advantage in pre-trial proceedings, the denial of such 
opportunities could not create constitutional prejudice that 
could be a relevant consideration in fashioning habeas 
relief. Applying this same standard to Henderson's case 
leads to the ineluctable conclusion that there could be no 
constitutional prejudice to Henderson if a subsequent 
suppression hearing later reveals that the confession relied 
upon by the jury was properly before it. 
 
D. 
 
This Court's conclusion that a new trial is required if a 
counseled suppression hearing reveals that Henderson's 
confession was properly admitted at trial is contrary to 
reason and directly clashes with the Supreme Court's 
holding in Jackson v. Denno. I therefore respectfully 
dissent. 
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